Absolutely stable games, in which every monotone chain of domination reduces to direct domination, are explicitly characterized. Simple games, and n-person games in which all minimal-vital coalitions contain at least n -1 players, are seen to satisfy the characterization.
Proof. Sufficiency. Assume that the conditions are satisfied, and consider a monotone chain (x0, Sx, x,, . . . , Sm, xm). We will show that x0 dom(5m) xm. By (a), all the coalitions of the chain can be assumed to be minimal-vital. By (2), (x0),-> (xm)i for all i G Sm. To begin, notice that xm_x(SJ < v(SJ, where for notational convenience we generally write x(S) = 2,6S(x),. Proceeding by induction, we assume xk(Sm) < v(Sm) and consider xk_x. If
Otherwise (b) applies to Sm, and either (i) Sk D Sm, or (ii) Sk Z) N -Sm. If (i) applies, then since Sk is minimal-vital, it follows that Sk = Sm and therefore **-i(Sm) = xk_xiSk) < v(Sk) = v(Sm).
On the other hand, if (ii) applies, then xk_xiN -Sm) > xkiN -Sm), and therefore
the last inequality following from the induction hypothesis. Thus in any case it eventually follows that x0iSm) < u(5m), and therefore x0 dom(Sm) xm. Necessity. Assume that T is minimal-vital with u(F) < 1, and consider any 5 for which viS) > 0, S ^ T, and S 2 N -T. Then R = N -iS u T)
=£ 0 and T -S ¥= 0-We write n, r, s, t for the respective cardinalities of N, R, S, T. Let
Then for sufficiently small e > 0, x dom(S).y dom(F) z. However, x does not dominate z, since x(F) > c(F). Hence v is absolutely stable only if for every minimal-vital T, either u(F) = 1, or every 5 with u(5) > 0 satisfies either S D T or S D N -T. This establishes the necessity of (b).
Next, assume that T is minimal-vital with u(F) < 1, and assume that (a) fails. Then there is a minimal nonempty coalition S for which S n 77 = 0, Department of Mathematics, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06268
XU F ^ A^, and c(S U T) > u(F). Select any

